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Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of an NBA player’s salary on the number of fouls drawn by
them in a season. NBA referees have complete discretion in making calls of whether a player
does or does not commit a foul in game, with decisions susceptible to bias, favoring certain
players with more fouls called in their favor than another player. The study uses salary to
determine a player’s value, using a panel dataset of all players from the 2015-16 NBA season
through the 2018-19 NBA season for salary and game statistics. The impact of salary is
determined using a quantile regression approach. The focus on the significance of salary on fouls
drawn. The results show statistically significant evidence of star-player bias by NBA referees.
Players with higher salaries can expect to receive a greater number of foul calls drawn per 48
minutes of play than players receiving a lower salary.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Referees, the arbitrators of rules in sports, often have the sole discretion to determine
when a play or sequence in a game violates a rule and requires a penalty or foul to be assessed
and when it does not. Due to the fast-paced nature and lenient interpretation of rules in the NBA,
referees in NBA games often have significant discretion in determining when a play warrants a
foul or not. This has led to a significant focus on referee bias when referees show favoritism or
rely on another factor unaffiliated with the play in question to help them make a judgement call.
Referee bias can result from a number of factors, referees may be biased against players based on
race, nationality, or height. Referees may favor home teams, teams with better records, or the
team losing in a game.
This study aims to examine the relationship between a player’s salary and the number of
fouls that player draws per 48 minutes of game play, the length of an NBA game. If a positive
relationship between the dependent variable, the foul drawn rate, and the variable of interest,
salary, is significant it will help teams develop better strategy by exploiting the inherent bias of
the referees. Highly paid players would be incentivized to play more aggressively because they
are more likely to receive foul calls in their favor on questionable plays and lower paid players
would have to adjust to a less aggressive style of play to avoid toss-up call situations that would
fall against them. A significant positive relationship would also increase the perceived value of
better free throw shooters because if these players are paid higher salaries, they are likely to
receive more fouls drawn, and by consequence get more free throw attempts. So, better free
throw shooters are more likely to convert these attempts into points, resulting in greater on-court
production.
This paper was developed from the previous literature on the topic of star player bias but
differs in two keyways. First, the variable of interest in this study is salary which is distinct from
the previous research on the topic that often use all-star selections as a determinant of star player
status. This research also uses a quantile regression approach to examine the relationship
between salary and foul rate. This regression method has been tested before in the field of sports
economics but has not been utilized in the research of star-player bias.
The following section of this paper, Section 2, examines the trends of fouls and salaries
in the NBA. Section 3 then provides a review of the previous literature on this issue. Section 4
spells out the data and empirical model and Section 5 discusses the results of the quantile

regression approach. Finally, Section 6 draws conclusions from the results and overall analysis
of the data.
2.0 NBA Statistics & Trends
On February 3rd, 2021 Paul George, an NBA all-star playing for the Los Angeles Clippers
told reporters he felt “absolutely disrespected” that he was only sent to the free throw line once
in his game against the Brooklyn Nets that night. That night George did not explicitly mention
his all-star as a reason for why he should receive more attempts at the free throw line, but the
implication had been made and a debate among media pundits, players, and NBA officials
ensued. Some feeling that George’s plays were toss up calls that could have been fairly assessed
against either team, or others who see George’s star player caliber status as a reason to have
more foul calls in his favor.
Ask almost any NBA fan and they will agree with the statement that referee bias exists in
the NBA, particularly in favor of star players. Many around the league believe referees favor the
highest paid, most noteworthy, all-stars by calling a greater number of fouls in their favor, either
calling a foul drawn on offense or not calling a foul against while on defense. These excess fouls
drawn are what Peter Li refers to as, “superstar calls”.
Figure 1: Average Fouls Called per Game in the NBA (1977-2013)

According to Figure 1 from basketball-reference.com and displayed on the chart above,
the number of fouls called on average in the NBA has been decreasing on a per game basis since
the late 1970’s. This trend has coincided with a multi-decade drop in the average points per game
in the NBA until the early 2000’s when average points per game began to rise again. These

results are displayed in Figure 2. Average points per game as of the 2017-18 NBA season remain
significantly below the levels of scoring seen in the 60’s, 70’s, and 80’s. This would mean as
points remain flat and fouls decrease, each foul becomes even more critical to the outcome of a
game.
Figure 2: Average Points per Game in the NBA (1947-2018)

Source: Charted Interest

While the number of fouls called and points scored over the past 30 – 40 seasons appears
to be dropping in correlation with each other, salaries have exploded in the NBA. According to
Figure 3 the average league increased from approx. $1 million in the 1991 season to over $8
million by the 2019 season. In inflation adjusted terms the average league salary quadrupled
during the 28-year span.
Figure 3: Average NBA Player Salary (1991-2019)

Source: Dimitrije Curcic

During the same span of time, as salaries boomed in the NBA the ratio of average to
median player salary also began to rise. This ratio is a barometer for the gap between highly paid

players and lower to mid-tier level teammates. As the ratio rose it reflected increasing salaries at
the top of the of the league’s income earners that was outpacing the growth of the rest of the
league’s players. By 2019 the ratio was over 2, the average salary in the NBA was more than
double the median salary in the league that year. The historical trend of the ratio is displayed in
Figure 4.
Figure 4: Average / Median Salary Ratio NBA (1991-2019)

Source: Dimitrije Curcic

While the NBA has seen a drop in fouls called per game and points scored per game over
their historical timeline and the average salary in the NBA has increased substantially with a
greater share of the pie going to the league’s top earners, surprisingly, these players have been
playing less. According to Sam Quinn of CBS Sports the average minutes per game by All-NBA
players has dropped by 4 minutes per game in the last 15 years. That translates to a loss of over
300 minutes over the course of an 82-game season. These trends point to potential important
relationships between salaries, players, and their impact on the game.
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
Referee bias in sports is a thoroughly researched topic with studies across many different
sports, spread throughout the world. Referee Bias can take on many different forms, though often
manifests itself in the number of fouls called for or against a player or team. Price & Wolfers
(2010) examined bias by referees based on race. They find own-race race bias from referee crews
to be statistically and practically significant, even when controlling for player and referee- fixed
effects. Price & Wolfers (2010) also specify a foul rate in the model to adjust for the differences
in minutes among players.

Referee bias in the NBA has not only been investigated on the basis of race and ethnicity,
but also, other factors like which team is home (Lehman & Reifman 1987 and Price, Remer &
Stone 2012), player’s height (Gift & Rodenberg 2014), and a player’s star power or marketability
(Caudill, Mixon & Wallace 2014). Elite players have long been suspected of receiving
preferential treatment in the NBA by referees. Caudill, Mixon & Wallace (2014) tested this
hypothesis on a dataset of players in the 2011 NBA playoffs. Star players were determined to
have received an all-star selection in either the current or previous season, or both. The authors
compared the free throw attempts per minute in the final quarter of the game to attempts per
minute in the preceding three quarters. The authors then examine the ratio of all-star players with
significantly positive excess free throw calculations to non-all-stars with excess free throws.
They find a statistically significant difference between all-star and non-all-star players with
respect to excess free throw attempts, suggesting evidence of referees making biased calls to
protect the leagues star players. Gift & Rodenberg (2014) examined the Napoleon Complex in
the NBA, a bias by shorter refereeing crews to give more fouls to taller players. The authors
determined a bias against taller players did exist using an OLS with fixed effects and the
dependent variable of a player’s foul rate.
Referee bias in favor of star players exists not only in the NBA but also in other sports
leagues around the world. Erikstad & Johansen (2020) examined the existence of referee bias in
the Norwegian Premier League. The authors utilized a Chi-squared test to examine if a
successful team received more penalties in their favor compared to an unsuccessful team. The
results showed bias in favor of successful teams did exist.
Quantile regression approach has been utilized in previous literature in sport, including
football (Keefer 2013), baseball (Fort, Lee & Oh 2019), and golf (Kahane 2010). The method is
often utilized in examining issues with salary in sport due to its advantages handling
nonnormality issues from skewness or outliers, player fouls drawn rate follows a similar skewed
distribution to salary. Scully (1974) was the first to employ the quantile regression method in a
sport related field when he examined the marginal revenue and value of players in the MLB.
4.0 DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
4.1 Data
The data used in this study consists of season observations from 4 NBA seasons from 2015-2016
to 2018-2019. Data on player position and statistics, including in-game performance data, was

provided by Basketball-Reference.com. Player annual salary data was provided by ESPN.
Players participating on “two-way contracts”, contracts allowing players to participate as a parttime member of the roster, were not included in the dataset due to the artificially low contract
salary they receive. A description of the variables used can be found in the appendix. The
summary statistics of the data are presented in Table 1:
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Salary

2,069

5,874,250

6,879,225

4,608

3.75e+07

Age

2,069

26.469

4.279

19

42

Center

2,069

0.2020

0.4016

0

1

GS

2,069

23.033

27.655

0

82

PTS

2,069

489.923

461.901

0

2818

DBPM

2,069

-0.1376

1.999

-29.1

42.7

FGA

2,069

398.045

357.326

0

1941

ThreePA

2,069

130.157

144.042

0

1028

TOV

2,069

62.648

59.848

0

464

Table 2 contains the correlation table to examine for potential collinearity and high
correlation among the variables.
Table 2: Correlation Statistics
Variables Salary

Age

Center

GS

PTS

DBPM

FGA

ThreePA TOV

Salary

1.0000

Age

0.2454 1.0000

Center

0.0125 -0.0223

1.0000

GS

0.5528 0.0249

-0.0301

1.0000

PTS

0.5878 0.0100

-0.0630

0.7958 1.0000

DBPM

0.0822 0.0538

-0.0143

0.0951 0.0478 1.0000

FGA

0.5692 0.0055

-0.0660

0.7961 0.9898 0.0291

1.0000

ThreePA

0.4115 0.0662

-0.0845

0.5715 0.7559 -0.0255

0.7805 1.0000

TOV

0.5366 -0.0001

-0.0963

0.7507 0.9041 0.0805

0.9017 0.6478

1.0000

4.2 Empirical Model
The model was developed from previous literature, using variables included in earlier
research by Price & Wolfers (2010) and Caudill, Mixon & Wallace (2014) which examined
referee bias in the NBA. The model is adapted to use salary as a proxy for star-player status and
a quantile regression approach previously used in Kahane (2010) and Keefer (2013) due to the
skewness of the dependent variable. The model is specified below:
Model (1): Foul_Drawn_Rateit = β0(θ) + β1 Salaryit(θ) + β2 Ageit(θ) + β3 Startsit(θ) + β4 Pointsit(θ) + β5
DBPMit(θ) + β6 FGAit(θ) + β7 3PFGAit(θ) + β8 TOit(θ) – β9 Centeri(θ)) + εθit

The dependent variable in the model, Foul_Drawn_Rateit, measures the number of fouls a
player draws per 48 minutes played for player i in season t. The variable is calculated by dividing
the number of fouls drawn by a player each season by the number of total minutes played and
then multiplying that result by 48. This approach balances the dataset to control for players
receiving significant different amount of playing time, a similar per minute adjustment has been
used in previous research on star-player bias by Caudill, Mixon & Wallace (2014).
There are nine independent variables in the model which were gathered from two
sources, ESPN and basketball-reference.com. A description of the variables and their respective
sources is included in the appendix as Appendix A. The first variable is Salaryit, the independent
variable of interest; this variable is used as proxy for star-player status, it measures the total
compensation a player i received after the conclusion of season t. Ageit represents the age, in
years, of player i in season t. Startsit represents the number of games a player i starts in season t.
Pointsit represents the number of total points scored by player i in season t. DBPMit is a
defensive index calculated using player defensive statistics, such as blocks, steals and fouls to
estimate the number of points above average a team can expect to score when player i is on the
court. FGAit represents the number of field goals player i attempts in season t. 3PFGAit represents
the number of three-point field goals a player i attempts in season t. TOit represents the number of
turnovers a player i commits in season t. Centeri represents a binary variable which takes on the
value of 1 if the player’s listed primary listed position is center and 0 otherwise. Finally, εθit
represents the error term in the model.

5.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 3 contains the results of the three quantile regressions specified. Results were
gathered for the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantiles. A standard OLS regression including all of the
variables in the original model was also specified to compare with the quantile regression results.
Table 3. Quantile Regression Results
th
th
th
Standard OLS
25 Quantile
50 Quantile
75 Quantile
Fouls_Drawn_Rate Fouls_Drawn_Rate Fouls_Drawn_Rate Fouls_Drawn_Rate
*

*

**

**

Salary

1.17e-08
(2.56)

Age

-0.0203
(-3.45)

-0.0197
(-3.76)

-0.0217
(-4.26)

-0.0246
(-3.41)

-0.0990
(-1.70)

-0.0425
(-0.82)

-0.0836
(-1.65)

-0.0943
(-1.32)

Center

***

***

9.74e-09
(2.39)

***

***

GS

-0.0114
(-8.02)

PTS

0.00629
(16.62)

0.00478
(14.19)

-0.0191
(-1.59)

-0.0214
(-2.00)

DBPM

***

***

FGA

-0.00602
(-11.67)

ThreePA

-0.00298
(-10.71)

TOV

0.00363
(3.83)
✓
✓
2069

Season Controls
Team Controls
N

***

t statistics in parentheses
*

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

***

-0.00702
(-5.53)

***

*

***

-0.00409
(-8.90)

***

-0.00290
(-11.71)

***

0.00444
(5.26)
✓
✓
2069

1.06e-08
(2.67)

***

***

-0.00982
(-7.94)

***

0.00641
(19.54)

***

-0.0346
(-3.32)

***

-0.00609
(-13.60)

***

-0.00299
(-12.41)

***

0.00422
(5.13)
✓
✓
2069

1.83e-08
(3.26)

***

***

-0.0129
(-7.35)

***

0.00687
(14.77)

***

-0.0509
(-3.44)

***

-0.00670
(-10.56)

***

-0.00325
(-9.50)
0.00377
(3.23)
✓
✓
2069

**

The results show evidence of star-player bias does exist in the NBA. The variable of
interest, Salary, appears significant in all of the quantile regressions as well as the OLS
regression. The variable becomes more significant at higher quantiles, only significant at the 5%
level of significance for the 25th quantile but significant at the 1% level for the 50th and 75th
quantile regression estimations. While the variable of interest is statistically significant the very
low magnitude of salary means the practical significance of the relationship is small. For
example, in the 75th quantile regression a player who receives a $10 million increase in salary
would expect to receive an extra 0.183 fouls drawn per 48 minutes played. However, the results
still show star-player bias exists and this would be consistent with the previous literature by
Caudill, Mixon & Wallace (2014) which also found evidence of star-player bias in the NBA.
Interpreting the results shows the impact of salary also increases at the higher quantile
levels. The 75th quantile regression has salary with nearly double the impact on fouls drawn than
the impact in the 25th quantile. Most of the controls also were highly significant across all of the
regressions estimated with the exception of Center which was not statistically significant in any
of the models, so player position does not affect a player’s fouls drawn rate. The variable Age
was statistically significant and negative, this is due to potential a decrease of aggressive playing
style as players gets older due to primarily the increased injury risk as players age. Many
variables had high levels of correlation and as expected, were all highly significant. These
variables were included despite their high levels of correlation because they measured player
performance and while they did not measure the same factors of player performance, they were
expected to correlate significantly regardless.
Ultimately a number of factors appear to have a statistically significant impact on the
number of fouls a player draws, and the controls were highly significant with the correct
anticipated signs. The variable of interest provides statistically significant evidence of star-player
bias by referees in the NBA and the effect of this bias increases at the higher quantile levels. As a
player’s salary rises the number of fouls they receive also increases, so the highly paid starplayers receive a greater number of fouls called in their favor than their lower paid counterparts.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The aim of this study was to determine if star-players in the NBA benefited from referee
bias by examining the number of fouls they draw per 48 minutes in relation to their salaries. The
finding show that star-player bias does exist in the NBA, players with higher salaries receive

preferential treatment by having a greater number of fouls called in their favor, even when
controlling for outside relevant factors. The results showed salary was significant in increasing
the number of fouls a player draws for each of the quantiles tested and the impact of salary
increases at the higher quantiles. While the results are statistically significant the small
magnitude of the salary variables shows only a significant change in salary would result in a
meaningful impact on the number of fouls drawn for a player. The results of this study match the
result of previous literature examining star-player bias by referees in the NBA.
Due to the highly skewed dependent variable a quantile regression was used which
differed from the previous literature. Salary was also used a proxy for star-player status in place
of all-star or all-NBA team selections more commonly used to determine star-player status. This
bias by referees allows higher paid players to exploit the bias by playing more aggressively,
confident they will receive a greater number of foul calls. Lower paid players, meanwhile, would
be advised to play less aggressively since they are likely to receive less calls in their favor. This
can also impact a coach’s decision-making and situational strategies in games. Future research
could focus on other potential sources of bias by referees which may impact the decision-making
of teams and coaches or affect the outcome of games. Research should also examine how a
team’s decision-making may be affected by the existence of star-player bias and how both high
paying players adjust their playing styles to benefit from or lower paid players avoid the negative
effects of star-player bias.
Appendix
Appendix A: Data Description
Variable Name
Foul_Drawn_Rate
Salary
Age
Center
GS
PTS
DBPM

Description
Number of fouls drawn by a player per 48
minutes played
Player
Player age at start of season
Player position = Center; 0 = No / 1 = Yes
Games started
Total points scored
Defensive Box Plus / Minus , estimate of the
number of points better or worse a team can
expect to perform with this specific player
on the court (Average is zero)

Source
Basketball-reference.com
ESPN Salary Database
Basketball-reference.com
Basketball-reference.com
Basketball-reference.com
Basketball-reference.com
Basketball-reference.com

FGA
ThreePA
TOV

Total field goal attempts
Total three-point field goal attempts
Total turnovers

Basketball-reference.com
Basketball-reference.com
Basketball-reference.com
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